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Abstrak
Artikel ini mengetengahkan pembahasan mengenai simbolisme 
agama dalam KTP (Kartu Tanda Penduduk) di Indonesia. Penghapusan 
status penunjukan agama di KTP adalah “isu sensitif” di Indonesia. 
Ia berhubungan dengan kelanjutan sisa-sisa alam pikiran Orde Baru, 
yang juga menyangkut bagaimana identitas agama kerap dipakai 
dalam pergaulan sehari-hari masyarakat Indonesia. Ditambah lagi, 
Indonesia sedang bergulat dengan keragaman agama, aktualisasi 
inklusi agama dan aliran kepercayaan di satu sisi serta perkembangan 
nasionalisme dan demokrasi di sisi lain. Makalah ini berpendapat 
bahwa perdebatan KTP dan simbol agama yang juga termasuk isu 
penting dalam kampanye Jokowi pada Pilpres 2014 lalu, adalah 
penanda bahwa keragaman agama dan inklusi merupakan aspek 
modernitas yang tak terduga. Sebagaimana hal itu dilihat oleh Peter 
L Berger. Makalah ini akan mengidentifikasi referen dari simbol 
KTP agama serta relevansinya dalam tata kehidupan keagamaan, 
demokrasi, dan sosial-politik Indonesia mutakhir.
Kata Kunci: KTP, identity, symbol, modernity
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On the 9th of July 2014, the Republic of Indonesia held its third 
presidential election, featuring two candidates, Prabowo Subianto 
(“Prabowo”) and Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”).61  This is the third 
presidential election since the 1998 demise of the Suharto “New Order” 
autocratic administration and it has resulted in a close race.62  On June 
18, 2014, the Jakarta Globe, “Indonesia’s most-read English-language 
newspaper,”63 reported a Jokowi campaign declaration that if elected, 
Jokowi would remove religious status from Indonesia’s national 
identity cards, the Kartu Tanda Penduduck or (“KTP”) in order to 
prevent religious discrimination.64  Musdah Mulia, a Jokowi campaign 
team member, confirmed this announcement citing as support for this 
stance the probable spawn of discriminatory practices in employment 
and victimization by “hard line groups.”65  Instead, she stated, faith 
61 A former commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) under the 
Suharto regime, Prabowo Subianto (“Prabowo”) is not new to Indonesian politics; he 
was a vice presidential candidate in the 2009 Indonesian presidential elections.  Prabowo 
has been described as a master strategist and who professed to run the country with 
a “strong hand.”  However, his candidacy has been dogged by human rights abuse 
allegations of action during his service in the New Order. Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), former 
mayor of Solo and current governor of Jakarta, is at the writing of this paper both the 
favored candidate and its unofficial victor.  A reputed “man of the people,” he has run on 
a platform of democracy, religious tolerance, market reforms (foreign investments and 
domestic market stimulations) and anti-corruption.  See collectively 2014 Indonesian 
Presidential Election Archives. The Jakarta Globe.  Retrieved from http://www.
thejakartaglobe.com/tag/2014-indonesia-presidential-election/; Author Unknown. 
(2014, July 19). Prabowo urged to bow out. The Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/18/prabowo-urged-bow-out.html.; Author 
Unknown (2014, July 18) Indonesia candidate admits role in abductions. Al Jazeera. 
Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/07/indonesia-
candidate-admits-role-abductions-201471764933349773; E. Bellman (2012, August 2) 
Indonesians Turn Gaze to Suharto-Era General.  Wall Street Journal Asia.  Retrieved from 
http://www.indonesia-digest.net/2300elections2014prabowo.htm;  M.S. Aritonang & 
R.A. Witular (2014, May 21)  Jokowi-Kalla hawkish on economic policies.  The Jakarta 
Post. Retrieved from http://www.indonesia digest.net/2300elections2014 jokowi.htm
62  Due to conflicting reports regarding the emergent victor, July 22, 2014 is the scheduled 
day election results are to be confirmed.  However, thus far, reputable media reports 
indicate Joko Widodo has won the race.  2014 Indonesian Presidential Election Archives. 
The Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/tag/2014-
indonesia-presidential-election/
63 Author Unknown.  “About Us” The Jakarta Globe.  Retrieved from http://www.
thejakartaglobe.com/about-us/
64 Paath, C. (2014, June 18). Joko, If Elected, Would Remove Religion Status on ID Card. The 
Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-elected-
remove-religion-status-id-card/
65 Specifically, according to the June 14, 2014 Jakarta Globe article, Musdah Mulia 
referenced as illustrative bases for the declaration the denial of a job applicant because 
his religious status was disparate from that of the employer, and the knowledge of one’s 
faith status “making it easier for a hardline group to conduct a religious sweep during 
a conflict.”  However, it is unclear from the article if she was the primary or exclusive 
source of this declaration as the newspaper simply references the “Jowoki campaign 
team” as the source of this announcement.  Paath, C. (2014, June 18). Joko, If Elected, 
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status should be recorded only for the purpose of collecting data on the 
population and for civil registry.”66  
However, this declaration proved to be premature and possibly 
inexact: on June 19, 2014, the Jakarta Globe reported a denial from the 
Jokowi camp of such an intention.67  Headlined “Joko-Kalla Campaign 
Team Denies Plan of Removing Religion Status on ID Card,” the article 
cited Hamka Haq, the head of the religious and cultural affairs division 
of Jokowi’s political party and fellow campaign team member.  In it 
Haq stated that while Jokowi was committed to preserving Indonesia’s 
diversity, it was neither Jokowi’s opinion nor a plan of his campaign to 
remove the religious designation from the KTP.68  Haq explained this 
was because the religious designation served useful purposes such as 
the prevention of misapplied religious requirements and the provision 
of religiously appropriate funeral rites.69 
To glean anecdotal responses to this volte-face by the Jokowi 
campaign, the author of this paper conducted informal opinion polls 
with reputable faculty experts from Indonesia’s Gadjah Mada University 
(UGM) and NGO personnel.70  It was the universal response that the 
removal of the religious status designation on the KTP was a “sensitive 
issue.” (UGM Faculty and NGO personnel personal communications, 
June 10, July 11, 14, 18, 2014).  Furthermore, when indexed, the offered 
hypotheses for the volte-face collated into two basic perspectives each 
premised on the delicacy of the issue: 1)Jokowi’s plan to eliminate the 
Would Remove Religion Status on ID Card. The Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-elected-remove-religion-status-id-card/ 
66 Paath, C. (2014, June 18). Joko, If Elected, Would Remove Religion Status on ID Card. 
The Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-
elected-remove-religion-status-id-card/ 
67 Sihaloho, M.J. (2014, June 19). Joko-Kalla Campaign Team Denies Plan of Removing 
Religion Status on ID Card. The Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://www.
thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-kalla-campaign-team-denies-plan-removing-religion-
status-id-card/
68 Ironically, Musdah Mulia and Sihaloho Sihaloho are both known academics in 
Indonesia.  Sihaloho, M.J. (2014, June 19). Joko-Kalla Campaign Team Denies Plan of 
Removing Religion Status on ID Card. The Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://www.
thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-kalla-campaign-team-denies-plan-removing-religion-
status-id-card/
69 Sihaloho, M.J. (2014, June 19). Joko-Kalla Campaign Team Denies Plan of Removing 
Religion Status on ID Card. The Jakarta Globe. Retrieved from http://www.
thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-kalla-campaign-team-denies-plan-removing-religion-
status-id-card/
70 On the matter of Jowoki’s volte-face and the KTP religious status designation issue, 
informal author led interviews  were conducted with American Friends Service 
Committee (Indonesian chapter of global NGO) personnel, personal communications, 
July 18, 2014; UGM Faculty R. Panggabean, personal communications, July 17 2014; 
UGM Faculty S. Cholil, M. Rahayupersonal, M.I. Ahnaf, personal communications, July, 
14, 2014; D. Sofjan, personal communications, June 10, 2014 & July 11, 2014
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religious status designation from the KTP was prematurely announced 
as a matter of poor strategy, hence he denied it.  Instead, he should 
have waited until he was elected president to declare his intention and 
2)Jokowi never intended on making this change but the announcement 
was made (perhaps unwittingly, surreptitiously, unintentionally 
or insubordinately) as a result of the varied and perhaps divergent 
political interests correlative to the various interest groups in his 
coalition based campaign.  (UGM Faculty personal communications, 
June 10, July 11, 14, 18, 2014).  
Due to these paradigmatic events, it is the position of this paper 
that the KTP religious status designation and corresponding debate 
(“KTP debate”) and the volte-face by the Jokowi campaign (“Jokowi 
volte-face”) are interconnected symbols of the internalized conflicts 
Indonesia faces in its evolution of identity development as a fledgling 
democracy - described by some as neither religious nor secular 
(Picard, 2011; UGM ICRS/CRCS Faculty personal communications, 
June 10, July 11, 14, 2014) 71  - as it continues to distance itself from 
the penumbra of the Suharto New Order shadow where the autocratic 
repression of publicized religion and the advancement of a uniform 
nationalism centered on the ideology of Pancasila reigned.  (Bottomley, 
2014; Picard, 2011; Cammack & Feener, 2012; Cholil, 2010).  And as a 
result, Indonesia is wrestling with the existence of religious diversity 
and the actualization of religious inclusion while its burgeoning 
identity is at the nexus of underlying values and identities such as 
Nationalism, Democracy72 and Religion held within the larger national 
debate of the constitution of and relationship between “religion[s]” 
(agama) and “belief[s]” (Aliran Kepercayaan)).73  Correspondingly, 
this unique cocktail of Indonesia’s characteristics poses important 
challenges to the assertions propounded by Drs. Clifford Geertz, Peter 
Berger and Samuel Huntington, in the areas of religion, modernity, 
and post Cold War global dynamics, respectively.  This paper argues 
71 Compare with Dr. Alexius Andang Binwan who on the one hand, describes Indonesia as a 
“non confessional state” in light of its state ideology Pancasila, which is comprised of five 
pillars: belief in one Almighty God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy guided by 
consensus and social justice and on the other, as a “religious state” because it “recognizes 
religion as an important factor in society.”  Binawan, A.A.L. (2011). Declarations and the 
Indonesian Constitution on Religious Freedom.  Al-Jami’ah, 49(2), 361-392.
72 See generally A. Stephan. (2011). The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and 
Non-Democratic Regimes. In C. Calhoun, C. Juergensmeyer, J. VanAntwerpen (Eds), 
Rethinking Secularism. (pp. 114-144). 
73 For more information about the Indonesia’s particular distinction between religion 
(agama) and belief (kepercayaan), as well as the distribution of power, agency and 
benefits ascribed between each, see Picard, M. (2011). Introduction: ‘Agama’, ‘adat’, 
and Pancasila. In M. Picard & R. Madinier (Eds.), The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: 
Syncretism, orthodoxy, and religious contention in Java and Bali (pp. 1-20). Abington, 
Oxon: Routledge.
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that the KTP debate and the attendant symbol of the Jokowi volte-
face are signifiers that religious diversity and inclusion74 are aspects 
of modernity unforeseen by Berger, misinterpreted and unaccounted 
for by Huntington and misaligned with Geertz’s model.  This paper 
will identify the referents of the symbol of the KTP religious status 
designation and will address the relevance, applicability and veracity 
of these theorists’ assertions to the current domain of religious diversity 
in the Indonesian landscape.
This is not the first time the public proposal to remove the 
religious status designation from the KTP has arisen.75  This issue of 
the designation of religious status on Indonesia’s national identity 
card has been a sensitive subject of significance in the Indonesian 
socio-political ethos76 and despite submitted calls for its removal, in 
2006 the Indonesian Parliament passed a law making its inclusion 
compulsory. (Bottomley, 2014; Cholil 2010).  The KTP functions as 
the basis of individual identification in Indonesia, and it includes an 
individual’s biometric information.  It serves various purposes in 
Indonesian society management and services navigation, including 
the affording a myriad of benefits, determination of appropriate 
funeral rites, access to education and health services, eligibility for 
government employment, issuance of marriage certifications as well 
as the tracking of demographic data. (Bottomley, 2014; Soemartono, 
2013).  By law, in order for Indonesian citizens to vote or apply for a 
passport, driver’s license, taxpayer identification, land rights, etc., their 
74 The term “diversity and inclusion” is industry specific terminology used in social identity 
work in the United States, in which the author has been engaged for more than a decade. 
Due to the fact that the term “religious pluralism” includes implications referencing the 
constitution of belief which is not the focus of the is piece.  Inclusion, a much broader 
and less connotative term, is the more appropriate choice to capture the challenges with 
religious difference Indonesia is facing particularly as it references not only the presence 
of diversity, but also its respectful and equitable inclusion in systemic power systems 
and structures, decision making, resource distribution and value setting, among other 
components.
75 Among those calling for the removal of the religious status on the KTP were the 
Indonesian Democratic Party, Indonesian Legal Aid and the National Integration 
Movement.  See Cholil, S. (2010). Freedom and Religion or Belief in Indonesia and 
the Challenge of Muslim Exceptionalism.  In S. Sinn & M.L. Sinaga (Eds.), Freedom and 
Responsibility: Christian and Muslim Explorations (pp. 117-134).  Minneapolis: Lutheran 
University Press/The Lutheran World Federation.Anonymous. (2011, September 9); A 
national identity card nightmare.  The Straits Times. Retrieved from http://sg.vlex.com/
vid/national-identity-card-491087554
76 Informal interviews conducted with American Friends Service Committee (Indonesian 
NGO) personnel, personal communications, July 18, 2014; UGM Faculty R. Panggabean, 
personal communications, July 17 2014; UGM Faculty S. Cholil, M. Rahayupersonal, M.I. 
Ahnaf,personal communications, July, 14, 2014; D. Sofjan, personal communications, 
June 10, 2014 & July 11, 2014 confirmed the importance and presence of this issue in 
recent Indonesian public discourse.
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KTP must be available.  (Bottomley, 2014).  Without it, one cannot get 
married within the Indonesia legal system, receive end of life benefits 
or other such services.  
Among the requisite identification details on the KTP, Indonesians 
must declare their religious identities from among the six state 
recognized religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, 
Hinduism or Confucianism  (Bottomley, 2014; Binawan, 2011; Picard, 
2011; Soemartono, 2013, Sirry 2006).  And if none of these are fitting 
(such as for practitioners of Aliran Kepercayaan, a collective reference 
to various forms of traditional belief systems or indigenous religions) 
citizens can elect to orient their religious status within the “other” 
category or abstain from declaring a religious designation altogether 
– both relatively new state sanctioned opportunities. (Cholil, 2010; 
Bottomley, 2014).  Despite these advances however, it is known 
that failure to mention a particular religion would be problematic, 
jeopardizing employment opportunities in civil and military service, as 
well as marriage registration and end of life ceremonies. 77  (Binawan, 
2011; UGM Faculty personal communications, June 10, July 11, 14, 
2014). 
In his “Critique of Modernity,” Berger states that at its core, 
modernity is the “transformation of the world brought about by 
technological innovations” altering economic, social and political 
elements well as revolutionizing human consciousness. (Berger, 
1977).  This transformation has imposed 5 “dilemmas” on humanity 
in this current epoch. (Berger, 1977).  Namely, they are 1)“abstraction”: 
addressing the intangibility of key social structures; 2)“futurity”: 
addressing the modern preoccupation with and focus on the future; 
3)“individuation”: addressing the increased individuation of humans 
and its counterposition to the society; 4)“liberation”: addressing the 
burden of increased choice and 5)“secularization”: addressing the 
“massive threat to the plausibility of religious belief and experience.” 
(Berger, 1977).  Yet what Berger neglected to include in his critique 
is the dilemma of being confronted by and living with the “other” in 
a way that the increased diversification of the planet has demanded. 
77 According to Dr. Suhadi Cholil, Indonesia inherited its religion-as-basis-of-categorization 
from its Dutch colonizers.  Dutch civil law as applied in Indonesia divided the populous 
by ethnicity and religion with the social hierarchy descending in the order of Dutch, 
Chinese, Indonesian Christian and Indonesian non-Christian.  With its independence, 
Indonesia retained this framework and included divisions between Muslim and non-
Muslim.  Four months after its independence, it created a Ministry of Religious Affairs to 
serve all Indonesian religions, although in actuality the department has been in service 
primarily for the Muslim majority.  Cholil, S. (2010). Freedom and Religion or Belief in 
Indonesia and the Challenge of Muslim Exceptionalism.  In S. Sinn & M.L. Sinaga (Eds.), 
Freedom and Responsibility: Christian and Muslim Explorations (pp. 117-134). 
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It is a reality with which humanity is being confronted through 
enhanced access to countries via modern transportation and shifting 
migratory patterns, the teleportation of the “human rights” concepts 
(and, by extension, identity rights) throughout the globe and instant 
access to inexhaustible information on any subject via the Internet. 
Consequently, I would submit that one of the “dilemmas” of modernity 
is the engagement with diversity and the encounter with the “other,” 
with such confrontations occurring on all levels of human engagement: 
interpersonal, group (e.g. organizational and national) and intergroup 
(e.g. global affairs).  The KTP debate and Jokowi volte-face depict this 
reality.
Indonesia, with a population of approximately 237 million, 
comprised of over 200 ethnic groups diffused among the more 
than 13,000 islands in the archipelago, is confronting this particular 
modernity challenge on all levels and especially through the social 
identity group of religion.  (Cholil, 2014; US State Department, 
2012).  It is a religiously plural state featuring a populous of 87% 
Muslim, 7% Protestant, 3% Roman Catholic and 1.5% Hindu.  (US 
State Department, 2012).  Other religious groups, such as Buddhists, 
Confucians, Christians of various denominations and those practicing 
Aliran Kepercayaan (traditional/indigenous belief systems) as well as 
non responders to the census, comprise 1.5% of the population. (Cholil, 
2014;78 US State Department, 2012).  The country’s Muslim population 
is largely Sunni (≥204 million); the minority Muslim groups are Shiites 
(1-3 million) and Ahmadiyyas (200-400,000).  It is estimated that 20 
million Indonesians comprise those considered Aliran Kepercayaan 
practitioners; there are approximately 400 different such communities, 
primarily located in the islands of Java, Kalimantan and Papua,. (US 
State Department, 2012).  Many of these practitioners commingle their 
beliefs with one of the state recognized religions under which they 
register their religious identity.  (US State Department, 2012; UGM 
Faculty personal communications, July 14, 17, 2014).  
Somewhat reminiscent of S.J. Tambiah’s descriptors of the role 
and function of the Thai government in Thai Buddhist polity, the 
requirement of religious status on KTPs indicates the Indonesian 
state’s influential relationship on Indonesian religious perspectives 
and practices.  (Tambiah, 1978; Bottomley, 2014; Sirry 2006).  This is 
elucidated by the Indonesian constitution, “the State shall be based 
78  Cholil notes that Buddhists comprise .6% and Confucians comprise .1% of the populous.  Cholil, S. (2010). Freedom 
and Religion or Belief in Indonesia and the Challenge of Muslim Exceptionalism. 
In S. Sinn & M.L. Sinaga (Eds.), Freedom and Responsibility: Christian and 
Muslim Explorations (pp. 117-134).  Minneapolis: Lutheran University Press/
The Lutheran World Federation.
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upon the belief in the One and Only God;” which significantly, the latter 
clause is the translation of the word Allah and the concept an influence 
of Islamic tenets. (Binawan, 2011).  Pursuant to this constitutional 
value, the KTP is a symbolic conduit sanctioned and used by the 
State to designate, establish and confirm the religious commitments 
and identities of Indonesian citizenry via the requisite religious status 
designation. (Bottomley, 2014).  The religious designation also has been 
selected by the Indonesian state to connote specific realities which, as 
the controversy motivating the Jokowi volte face indicates, many in 
the public have adopted and certain factions therein have expanded. 
It is the threat of subversion to the realities collectively signified by 
the KTP religious status requirement that is the source of the express 
resistance to its elimination.  
The role of the KTP in Indonesian society and the current realities 
it conveys mushroomed during Suharto’s New Order regime.79  The 
autocrat used it as a chief way to differentiate non-communists 
from any survivors of his communist purge or former members of 
the Indonesian communist party (PKI) banned under his regime.80 
(Bottomley, 2014; UGM Faculty personal communications, June 
10, July 11, 14, 2014).  Over a short period, the function of the KTP 
accelerated from preventing communism to include religious issues: 
in 1977, the state legislated the inclusion of religious affiliation on 
the KTP and in 1978, mandated its limitation to the state recognized 
religions.  (Bottomley, 2014).  To leave this status blank was tantamount 
to a declaration of atheism, which during the New Order equated 
communism, and triggered discrimination and possibly death. 
(Bottomley, 2014; UGM Faculty personal communications, June 10, 
July 11, 14, 2014).  Such action accords with Bottomley’s explanation 
that the “KTP ensures a ‘proper’ Indonesia, one where authentic 
79 Dr. Daniel C. Bottomley explains the ubiquity and importance of the KTP began 
in Suharto’s New Order; its progenitor used during the time of Sukarno was the 
innocuous Kartu Keluarga (Family Card), the most commonly used governmental 
identification card which simply contained a list of family births and deaths. 
Bottomley, D.C. (2014). The KTP Quandary: Islam, the Ahmadiyya, and the 
reproduction of Indonesian Nationalism.  Contemporary Islam: Dynamics of 
Muslim Life, (pp. 10-12). doi:10.1007/s11562-014-0302-2
80 Those identified as former PKI affiliates or political prisoners received special 
demarcations on their cards and discrimination from Indonesian bureaucracies. 
The cards were mandated by the state to be carried at all times in certain 
regions of the nation.  The ban on communism fostered a sense of national 
community, the aim of the Suharto government.  Bottomley, D.C. (2014). The 
KTP Quandary: Islam, the Ahmadiyya, and the reproduction of Indonesian 
Nationalism.  Contemporary Islam: Dynamics of Muslim Life, (pp. 10-12). 
doi:10.1007/s11562-014-0302-2
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citizenry is produced and maintained.”81  (Bottomley, 2014).  The 
fears of communism also commingled with those of secularization, a 
deplored condition identified with the West.82  (UGM Faculty personal 
communications, June 10, July 11, 14, 2014).  Here began the symbiotic 
relationship between ideology, citizenry, anti-Westernization and 
religiosity in Indonesia, as represented by the KTP.  It also codified the 
“otherizing” of those who were communist and/or not religious as 
well as their demotion to being suspect and less than Indonesian.  With 
this understanding, the first and primary reality the KTP religious 
designation signifies is that Indonesia is both secular and communist 
free, meaning for one to avoid the epithet of communist or secular, 
one must present oneself as religious.  (Bottomley, 2014; Binawan, 
2011; UGM Faculty personal communications, June 10, July 11, 14, 
2014).  Moreover, through the [symbol of the] religious designation 
requirement on the KTP, all are reminded that these diversities are not 
acceptable.
Second, the religious designation of the KTP signifies the fact 
that Indonesia is a Muslim country, as indicated by the majority of 
Indonesians who designate Islam as their religion on their KTP and by 
extension, that the Sunni tradition is the superior and most orthodox 
and correct of all other Muslim schools.  Moreover, it signifies that 
as the dominant religion, Islam is the most powerful, imbuing state 
governance with Muslim principles and values.  (Picard, 2011; Sirry, 
2006).  This depiction of reality has been manifested particularly during 
in the period of the Reformasi (the era of the post Suharto New Order 
regime Reform). (Picard, 2011; Sirry, 2006).  For example, the Indonesian 
Ministry of Religion was designed to provide a state apparatus for 
all the state sanctioned religions.  However, in reality it has been in 
service primarily for the Muslim majority (Picard, 2011; Binawan, 2011; 
Sirry, 2013).  As proponents of christening Islam the official religion 
of Indonesia, the Ministry has “framed and shaped” the country’s 
debates about religion through endeavoring to restrict the definition 
of legally qualifying religions to characteristics comporting with the 
Islamic view of legitimate religion, namely that which is “exclusivist, 
congregational, scripturalist and universalist,” as well as publically 
imposed their conception of state and religion relations.  (Picard, 2011). 
This collective reality signified by the KTP also has been manifested 
81 Bottomley, D.C. (2014). The KTP Quandary: Islam, the Ahmadiyya, and the 
reproduction of Indonesian Nationalism.  Contemporary Islam: Dynamics of 
Muslim Life, (pp. 10-12). doi:10.1007/s11562-014-0302-2
82 Notably in his assessment of the history of the “civilizations,” Sam Huntington observes 
that all political ideologies, including Marxist thought, came from the West, whereas 
the world’s major religions came from the East.  Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.  
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through other means, such as in the laws requiring both legal and 
community approval for the erection of non-Muslim religious spaces 
(i.e. Christian churches) near proximate mosques (distanced defined 
by regulation),83 or in the prevailing understanding that employment 
with the government is largely reserved for Muslims, a trend that is 
facilitated and maintained via religious status disclosures on the KTP. 
(UGM Faculty personal communications, June 10, July 11, 14, 2014).  
As the representatives of the dominant religion, Muslim 
stakeholders such as Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama’ 
Council or MUI) as well as the Muhummadiyah and the Nahdatul 
Ulama (NUI) have been influential in shaping the receptivity of 
the country to religious diversity and inclusion.  The MUI is a state 
sponsored organization consisting of Islamic clerics and Muslim 
intellectuals seeking a more Islamic Indonesia, although it was 
founded to produce fatwas to advise the Muslim community about 
contemporary issues and mostly responds to governmental initiatives. 
(Cammack & Feener, 2012).  It has a complex relationship with the 
state and society as it is not consistently in accord with either of their 
perspectives.  (Sirry, 2013; Cammack & Feener, 2012).  In July 2005, 
the MUI issued a fatwa banning secularism, religious pluralism and 
religious liberalism, stating it was haram for the Muslim community 
to follow such perspectives.  (Sirry, 2013)  The fatwa distinguishes 
between religious pluralism and plurality of religions, clarifying that 
the former focuses on the veracity of the religious truths (all religions 
are considered the same, truth is relative, therefore claims of exclusive 
truth are wrong) while the latter focuses on the existence of religions 
(acknowledgement of the reality that adherents of different religions 
may share a certain country or residential area).  Of the two, it is 
plurality of religions, not religious pluralism that is acceptable to MUI. 
(Sirry, 2013).  While this is a comprehensible distinction, however, 
in the realities of daily Indonesian life, these terms’ referents are 
interchangeable for many.  Regardless, in furtherance of their prevention 
of religious pluralism advancement, the MUI issued a fatwa banning 
Muslims from attending Christmas celebrations, interreligious prayer 
83 It is the author’s understanding that this legal requirement is limited to the island of Java 
and is not required for the erection of mosques.  Due to the Muslim majority comprising 
the island, this requirement has been challenging to meet given the many mosques 
in the area, and thus, the erection of the religious spaces have been generally due to 
the goodwill and inclusive attitudes of the community.  However, where the majority 
community has been resistant to the presence of other religious buildings in their 
locale, responses have included a refusal to grant the requisite permission, a reporting 
of the absence of the precursory permissions or a filing of allegations of improper 
documentation.  (UGM Faculty personal communications, June 10, July 11, 14, 2014).  
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if led by a non Muslim and marrying non-Muslims.84  (Sirry, 2013).  The 
MUI also addressed the purity of its own tradition issuing a corollary 
fatwa stating the Ahmadiyah is not part of Islam because of their 
identification of the last prophet as someone other than the prophet 
Muhammad.  (Sirry, 2013).  Ironically however, the power of the KTP 
designation has thwarted the impact of this ruling to some degree. 
Through the self-selection process for the KTP religious designation 
a member of the Ahmadiyah sect, choosing Islam as their religion can 
be legitimized in the eyes of the government process although perhaps 
not in those of the [Sunni] ulama or Sunni influenced government. 
(Bottomley, 2014).  Bottomley characterizes this activity as the “Islam-
KTP” phenomenon, which references an individual who is Muslim 
in KTP name only.  (Bottomley, 2014).  And due to this capacity for 
self-selection, one’s KTP declaration of religious identity can become 
disingenuous, misrepresenting both the citizen’s beliefs as well as the 
total number of Indonesian Muslims.  But as being Muslim can be 
a smart and advantageous matter of civic survival, there emerges a 
necessary discrepancy between one’s personal (individual) and one’s 
public (governmental) religious life; all due to the signification of the 
KTP religious states designation and all it connotes.
In addition, the existence of Indonesian Muslim extremists groups 
such as the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or “FPI”) and 
Negara Islam Indonesia (“NII”) confirm the signification of this reality. 
Each have been adamant against any belief or practice divergent from 
their interpretation of Islamic practice. (Rohmaniyah, I. & Woodward, 
M., 2012).  Arguably fringe and admittedly comprising a small 
percentage of the populous, these groups are highly influential despite 
their low numbers comparable to the rest of the populous, and are 
at times tacitly endorsed by the state. (Rohmaniyah, I. & Woodward, 
M., 2012).  Collectively, this has resulted in hate speech and violent 
attacks against those deemed deviant from their distinct Islamic 
values.  In fact, the MUI’s fatwas and Indonesia’s blasphemy laws also 
84 While these fatwas are mentioned for illustrative purposes, the author is careful to 
note Dr. Mun’im Sirry’s provision of context for the MUI fatwa forbidding Muslims 
to participate in Christmas celebrations.  He states that the “fatwa was not born in a 
vacuum, but shaped by a long history of Muslim-Christian evangelical rivalry in Indonesia 
since the beginning of the twentieth century;” which intensified during the conversions 
of former communist Indonesians to Christianity which Muslims, despite also having 
converts, viewed as a threat.  Sirry indicates this fatwa was motivated by suspicions 
of any means of proselytization of Muslims, and “issued at a time of intense mistrust 
between Muslims and Christians.”  Like Indonesia’s practice of religious categorization, 
this rivalry has part of its roots in the practices of the Dutch colonial government.  For 
further information on this subject, see Sirry, M.A. (2013). Fatwas and their controversy: 
The case of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
44(1), 100-117.
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have been cited as provocateurs of interreligious discrimination and 
violence.  (Bottomley, 2014; US Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, 2013).  As a reminder, these are the very concerns allegedly 
cited by the Jokowi campaign for the removal of the religious status 
designation, which other civic stakeholders also stated.  In fact, rumors 
have abounded, reportedly, of the KTP being used to ascertain whom 
to attack during bouts of religious violence in Indonesia as well as to 
determine access to employment in civil service positions, education 
in preferred schools and other civic benefits.  (Bottomley, 2014; US 
State Department, 2012; UGM Faculty R. Panggabean, personal 
communications, July 17 2014; S. Cholil, M, M.I. Ahnaf, personal 
communications, July, 14, 2014).
Indonesia’s wrestling with this particular modernity dilemma of 
religious diversity and inclusion has not been a private matter.  It has 
been witnessed on the international and regional human rights scene 
due to Indonesia’s membership in various international organizations. 
Because Indonesia is a member of the United Nations, it is beholden to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); as it is a member 
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and identifies 
as a Muslim [representative] country, it is obligated to the Universal 
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) and is a signatory 
of the Cairo Declaration of Islamic Human Rights, respectively;85 
and due to its membership in the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), it is a signatory to the Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok 
Declarations. (Binawan, 2011).  As Dr. Alexius Andang L. Binawan 
outlines, each set of declarations hold differing views on the concepts 
of deity and religion, rights to religious freedom and the relationship 
between religion and the state.  Despite being a signatory of all three 
declarations however, Indonesia has used Islamic parameters in its 
determinations of state sanctioned religions as well as its rejection of 
atheism and its historical resistance to recognizing Aliran Kepercayaan 
as religion.  (Binawan, 2011).86  Of significant note is the marker of 
85 In his article “Declarations and the Indonesian Constitution on Religious Freedom,” 
Binawan explains the Cairo Declaration of Islamic Human Rights was signed by the 
official representatives of the Muslim countries, and that the UIDHR is considered 
complementary to the Cairo Declaration because of the similarity of ideas contained 
therein.  Indonesia is a signatory of both.  Binawan, A.A.L. (2011). Declarations and the 
Indonesian Constitution on Religious Freedom.  Al-Jami’ah, 49(2), 361-392.
86 In his article on Indonesia and Human Rights, Binawan explains that while the contents 
of Indonesia’s constitutional granting of the religious rights to embrace ones religion 
and to worship are similar to the international standard (UNHR) and broader than those 
afforded in Islam, it has used Islamic parameters in determining religions and emphasizing 
the monotheistic character of its recognized deity.  He also posits the influences of Islam 
in the state’s limitations on the propagation of religion as well as the intervention of the 
state in each religion, especially in Islamic affairs.  Binwan asserts that this is closer to 
the Islamic model of governance as opposed to the ‘universalist’ model which prefers 
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flexibility in its recognition of Buddhism and Hinduism. (Binawan, 
2011).
Upon review of all these factors, Jokowi’s volte-face is comprehensible 
as the religious status designation required by the KTP is laden with the 
signification of ideology, citizenry, nationality and anti Westernization, 
and if one is Sunni Muslim, also of dominance, superiority and 
religious orthodoxy and correctness.  It also indicates how the KTP’s 
religious status designation embodies difference and otherizing.  In 
light of this, the mandated self-designation of religion status enables 
the state and society to monitor these signifiers because much more 
than census data is collected via this identity card mechanism.  Indeed, 
in Indonesia religion is a cultural system, in accordance with Geertz’s 
description of such in his seminal anthropological theory.  (Geertz, 
1973).  The religious status of the KTP also symbolizes a particular 
role and function of religion, which as Geertz explains, is to address 
humanity’s needs for meaning - particularly in the quotidian aspects of 
life - as well as to provide anxiety management for its existential angst. 
(Geertz, 1973).  The irony is while under this rubric religion is designed 
to keep the [psychological] societal order, Indonesia is struggling with 
the anxiety evoked by the religious diversity and the demand for 
religious inclusion in its midst, particularly notable within its Muslim 
community.  Due to this, its responsive coping mechanisms to this 
anxiety may include religiously intolerant, exclusionary, contradictory 
and/or discriminatory practices, policies or religious edicts as well 
as the hate speech and violence.87  (Cholil, 2012; Rohmaniyah & 
the separation of religion and state.  But, he also argues the state’s emphasis on the 
importance of national stability and religious harmony can be characterized as the 
Asian view on human rights, which emphasizes cultural relativity: a value mentioned 
in the Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok Declarations.  Binawan, A.A.L. (2011). Declarations 
and the Indonesian Constitution on Religious Freedom.  Al-Jami’ah, 49(2), 361-392; 
see generally A. Stephan. (2011). The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and 
Non-Democratic Regimes. In C. Calhoun, C. Juergensmeyer, J. VanAntwerpen (Eds), 
Rethinking Secularism. (pp. 114-144).
87 For example, while Indonesia’s 1974 Marriage law does not expressly forbid interfaith 
or interreligious marriages, it mandates that marriage ceremonies must be conducted 
in accordance with a state sanctioned religion before it can be registered.  While facially 
neutral, it has a disparate impact as some of these religions forbid marrying outside 
the faith (for example the MUI issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims from marrying 
non-Muslims).  This has resulted in a commonly known practice that in Indonesia 
interreligious or interfaith marriages are forbidden.  In response, the betrothed either 
will temporarily convert to net religious homogeneity, reverting back to the preferred 
religion after the nuptials are completed, or travel outside the country to be married as 
marriages performed in other countries are recognized by Indonesia. Sirry, M.A. (2013). 
Fatwas and their controversy: The case of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 44(1), 100-117; see also Cholil, S. (2009). The Politico-
Religious Contestation Hardening of the Islamic Law on Muslim-non-Muslim marriage in 
Indonesia.  In G.W Jones, C. H. Leng, et al. (Eds.), Muslim-Non-Muslim Marriage: Political 
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Woodward, 2012; Berger, 1977; Bottomley, 2014; Binawan, 2011; Picard, 
2011; Sirry, 2013; Sirry, 2006).
However, because religion serves a cultural function, Geertz argues 
that it also operates both as an interpreter and a shaper of the social and 
psychological processes of its creators and adherents.  (Geertz, 1973). 
It is a rubric from which social and psychological functions flow.  As 
a result, religion does not have to be [only] a hindrance to religious 
diversity and inclusion within such a system, it can become its ally and 
advocate.  As verification of this, religion is currently functioning as 
both in Indonesian society, and paradigmatic of this dialectal conflict 
is Indonesia’s participation in somewhat conflicting international and 
regional declarations.88  As such, how could this state not lead to an 
atmosphere of equivocation?  It is for this reason Geertz’s theory, 
while useful for understanding religion’s function as a monolithic 
entity, is not able to address the complexities that arise within the kiln 
of religious diversity that is the reality within the Indonesian Muslim 
community and starkly apparent in the larger Indonesian religious 
community. 89  Moreover, the social and psychological processes 
present within Indonesia’s cultural collective are not all uniform. It is 
therefore misaligned with the current realities of religious diversity as 
illustrated by Indonesian society.
Yet, Geertz’s theory does underscore that as a cultural system, 
religion is comprised of a “system of symbols” created by humans. 
(Geertz, 1973).  And as a product of the creative process, religion and its 
role can be reimagined and redefined as often as necessary to respond 
and Cultural Contestations in Southeast  (pp. 139-160).  Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies.  Or the lack of meaningful state recognition of practitioners of Aliran 
Kepercayaan. Picard, M. (2011). Introduction: ‘Agama’, ‘adat’, and Pancasila. In M. 
Picard & R. Madinier (Eds.), The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, orthodoxy, 
and religious contention in Java and Bali (pp. 1-20). Abington, Oxon: Routledge.
88 As aforementioned, Binawan delineates Indonesia’s signatory membership in various 
international declarations based on its nationality, ethnicity and religiosity, respectively, 
and diagnoses how these obligations can be contradictory in key aspects.  Binawan, 
A.A.L. (2011). Declarations and the Indonesian Constitution on Religious Freedom.  Al-
Jami’ah, 49(2), 361-392
89 And by way of further illustration, despite Dr. Clifford Geertz’s familiarity with Indonesia, 
his theory neglects the tensions resulting from the practice of Aliran Kepercayaan as 
well as the underlying conflict between “religion” or “agama” (e.g. Islam) and “belief” 
(kepercayaan), which it has settled by officially recognizing and sanctioning the former 
and diminishing the latter through actions arguably described as demotive.  For more 
information about the Indonesia’s particular distinction between religion (agama) and 
belief (kepercayaan), as well as the distribution of power, agency and benefits ascribed 
between each, see Picard, M. (2011). Introduction: ‘Agama’, ‘adat’, and Pancasila. In M. 
Picard & R. Madinier (Eds.), The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, orthodoxy, 
and religious contention in Java and Bali (pp. 1-20). Abington, Oxon: Routledge.
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to the evolving social and psychological processes of the collective. 
Accordingly, Indonesia can recreate religion (namely, what constitutes 
agama or do away altogether with distinguishing between religion 
and belief) and its role in society in order to have a more inclusive 
country where religious minorities are treated equitably and religious 
difference is not threatening or ascribed disparate power or dominion. 
Of strongest support of this ability to create is Geertz’s assertion that the 
symbol and its referents are not identical.  This assertion is the linchpin 
in the cornerstone of his theory of religion as a cultural system, and its 
veracity creates the room between symbol and reality for the alchemy 
necessary for religious inclusiveness to occur. 
Samuel Huntington’s post Cold War theory that global affairs will 
take the form of civilizational identity development, engagement and 
conflicts (Huntington, 1996) also does not incorporate the Indonesian 
realities of religious diversity symbolized by the KTP debate and Jokowi 
volte-face.  Heralded as the “Clash of the Civilizations,” Huntington 
argues that the post Cold War global scene will be “multipolar” and 
“multicivilizational” with humanity organized and identified by 
“civilizations” - serving as the basis of conflict - instead of ideology, 
nationality or economics, the identity organizing principles of the Cold 
War.90  Further, he argues that religious difference is a distinguishing 
and determinative characteristic of civilizations, and as such, six of the 
eight civilizations he demarcates as culturally distinguishable by their 
religion.  (Huntington, 1996).  However, Huntington misinterprets the 
composition of post Cold War conflict presuming it will be informed 
according to his designation of civilizational identities, chiefly 
demarcated by a uniformly practiced religion.  And as such, conflicts 
would occur across civilizations, and particularly religions, and not 
within them.  According to Huntington’s prediction, Indonesia would 
have no internal conflict as it constitutes both an Islamic civilization 
and an Asian civilization.  However, Indonesia disproves his case, 
as its social identity based conflicts have abounded in both its Asian 
and Islamic civilization matrixes.  Indonesia’s Muslim community 
particularly illustrates this due to its intragroup diversity and attendant 
90 Huntington delineates the following as the eight post Cold War civilizations: Sinic 
(Chinese), Japanese, Hindu, Islamic (comprised of Arab, Turkic, Persian and Malay), 
Western (comprised Europe, North America and the “European Settler Countries” 
Australia and New Zealand), Orthodox (comprised of Byzantine/Russian), Latin America 
and “possibly” Africa.  He posits that the post Cold War era will be hallmarked by the 
emerging assertiveness by Asian and Islamic civilizations of their superiority to the 
West (which Huntington states “arguably” includes Latin America) and the collective 
resistance of non Western civilizations to the hegemonic power of the West as they grow 
in economic power and cultural pride.  According to Huntington’s criteria, Indonesia 
constitutes both Islamic and Asian civilizations. Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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conflicts, assortatively found among the traditionalists located in the 
NU; the modernists, both conservative and liberal/expansive, located 
in the Muhammadiyah; as well as the Sunni, Shia, Ahmadiyah and 
the Muslim extremists.  (Sirry, 2006; Rohmaniyah, I. & Woodward, 
M., 2012).  Hence Huntingon’s prescience was amiss: the post Cold 
War conflicts he foresaw were tragically misplaced, relegated only to 
the arena between civilizations.  Indonesia’s intra-religious diversity 
is in direct opposition to Huntington’s uniform categorization of 
civilizations, and in converse of his own schema, Indonesia’s current 
religious habitat indicates that conflict can occur within civilizations as 
well as between them.  
The 2014 Indonesian presidential election underscored the 
national import of the KTP debate as symbolized through the Jokowi’s 
volte-face.  As it illustrated, the KTP debate signifies Indonesia’s 
confrontation with its religious diversity as well as its wrestling with 
religious inclusion, a collective critical “dilemma of modernity” not 
referenced by Berger, foreseen by Huntington or accommodated by 
Geertz’s model.  Therefore Indonesia must find its own way to respond 
to this reality, with its unique dialectic of Islamic proclivities, national 
universalistic aspirations (as embodied in the value of Pancasila) and 
“Indonesian” identity formation within its democratic pronouncement 
of human rights and religious freedom so that religious diversity can 
exist in an inclusive environment.  To do this requires the political and 
social will to unshackle religion from its current referents of ideology, 
nationalism, citizenry, secularization, Westernization and exclusivity 
and to create new meanings for current symbols or entirely new 
symbols altogether.  And while this may not be easy, as Indonesia is 
in the midst of developing its democratic identity, now is the perfect 
time to do so.
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